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     NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 03-1005
SYED ZUFIGAR UL HASSAN,
    Petitioner
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
   Respondent
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA No. A70-528-890)
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 25, 2004
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, FISHER and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Filed   November 23, 2004)
OPINION OF THE COURT
2SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
Petitioner Syed Zulfigar Ul Hassan, a native and citizen of Pakistan, seeks review
of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) on
December 5, 2002.  The order affirmed the immigration judge’s decision to deny Mr.
Hassan’s request for asylum, withholding of removal and protection under the
Convention Against Torture.  We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s order under 8
U.S.C. § 1252.  We will affirm.
I.
Mr. Hassan arrived in the United States on or about July 24, 1991, as a non-
immigrant visitor with permission to remain until January 23, 1992.  He stayed beyond
the authorized period and filed a request for asylum based on persecution for political
opinion on April 9, 1992.  
Before coming to this country, Mr. Hassan was an auto mechanic and a member of
the left-leaning Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in the town of Gujrat.  He claims that in
April 1991, while the local government was under the control of the fundamentalist
Muslim League party, he was detained for sixteen days and beaten by the police. 
According to Mr. Hassan, he was released from jail only after his father and other PPP
members paid 80,000 rupees to authorities.  He was allegedly hospitalized for two weeks
as a result of the beatings.  He subsequently returned to his job as an auto mechanic.  He
claims that a few weeks later, plain-clothes police and/or Islamic terrorists shot at his
3garage.  He then decided to leave Pakistan.  Mr. Hassan believes he could be detained
again if he is returned to Pakistan under the present military government because of his
past persecution and certain damage-to-property complaints and warrants filed against
him at that time.  He has not been actively involved with the PPP since leaving Pakistan.
At a hearing on August 8, 2001, the immigration judge denied Mr. Hassan’s
asylum, withholding, and Convention Against Torture claims.  Noting inconsistencies in
his testimony and his asylum application submissions, the immigration judge found that
Mr. Hassan was not credible and that he had failed to establish past persecution or a well-
founded fear of future persecution.  He also found that he was not likely to be tortured if
he were returned to Pakistan.
Where the BIA summarily affirms the immigration judge’s decision without
opinion, we review the immigration judge’s opinion.  Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 245
(3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).  We review the immigration judge’s factual determinations
under the substantial evidence standard, meaning that we will uphold findings “to the
extent they are ‘supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the
record considered as a whole.’”  Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157, 161 (3d. Cir.
1998) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992)).  
II.
For a petitioner to establish he is a refugee eligible for asylum, he must
demonstrate that he is unable or unwilling to return to his country of origin “because of
4persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)
(1999).  A petitioner for asylum bears the burden of supporting his claim through credible
testimony.  Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F. 3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002).  An adverse credibility
finding by the immigration judge should be supported by a specific, cogent reason for the
disbelief in petitioner’s testimony.  Balasubramanrim, 143 F.3d at 161-62.  In asserting a
claim under the Convention Against Torture, the applicant must establish “that it is more
likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of
removal.”  8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); see also Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F. 3d 180, 188
(3d Cir. 2003).  
In finding Mr. Hassan’s testimony not credible, the immigration judge pointed to
inconsistencies in his testimony regarding the following: the place of his arrest in April
1991, the extent of his political activities after his detention, the date of the shooting at
the garage and the identity of the shooters.  The immigration judge also noted that
supporting letters from Mr. Hassan’s lawyer in Pakistan and PPP district president lacked
corroborating details about his arrest, torture and resulting two-week hospitalization. 
Although Mr. Hassan may have explanations for these ambiguities, we could find
nothing in the record on appeal to show that the immigration judge lacked substantial
evidence in making his adverse credibility finding.  After noting the inconsistencies, the
immigration judge duly examined Hassan’s submissions to see if corroboration might
5shed light on them.  The corroborating letters, however, lacked specific information. 
Hassan’s attorney points to no other facts in the record and makes no argument to the
effect that the immigration judge overlooked or ignored relevant facts that would resolve
the ambiguities in Mr. Hassan’s favor.  As such, we conclude on this record that
substantial evidence supports the immigration judge’s adverse credibility determination.
Hassan also argues that his case should be reopened and remanded because of a
changed circumstance, namely his marriage to a Hindu woman of Indian origin and a
United States citizen.  Hassan claims that, if forced to return to Pakistan, both he and his
wife and family would be at risk of persecution on account of her race, religion and US
citizenship.  The BIA found, however, that “[Hassan] did not sufficiently demonstrate
that conditions in Pakistan have changed such that he, as an ‘Americanized’ Muslim
Pakistani, or as the husband of a Hindu United States citizen of Indian descent, will suffer
persecution or torture if removed to Pakistan.”  Even taking into account the deplorable
state of Muslim-Hindu relations in Pakistan, we do not believe that the fact of his recent
marriage adds enough to Mr. Hassan’s claim to support a well-founded fear of future
persecution in this case, especially where substantial evidence otherwise underpins denial
of the claim.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that substantial evidence supported the
immigration judge’s findings and the BIA’s order.  We will accordingly affirm.
